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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 1h 
STATE OF UTAH .UN1VERSITY UTl.H 
D.A.V. CHAPTER No. 6; AMERICAN 
LEGION POST 60; ·THE KENT CLUB; 
THEM. & B. CLUB, Inc.; D.A.V. CHAP-
TER No. 11; CLUB LAUREE, all non-
profit corporations, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE\ 
STATE OF UTAH ; LAMONT "~~ 
r:· ',~..,., TORONTO, duly elected official "'~>\ th~ · 
above office, '7 
Defendants. 
PETITION OF PLAINTIFFS FOR REHEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
RAY S. McCARTY and 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Petitioners 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
D.A.V. CHAPTER No. 6; AMERICAN 
LEGION POST 60; THE KENT CLUB; 
THEM. & B. CLUB, Inc.; D.A.V. CHAP-
TER No. 11; CLUB LAUREE, all non-
profit corporations, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH ; LAMONT F. 
TORONTO, duly elected official to the 
above office, 
Defendants. 
No. 8341 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiffs and petitioners in the above entitled cause 
respectfully petition the court for a rehearing in the 
above entitled case, and request the court to vacate and 
set aside its ruling of January 5, 1957, recalling and 
quashing the writ granted on the 14th day of April, 
1955, enjoining the Secretary of State of the State of 
Utah from taking any action whatsoever under H. B. 16, 
legislature of 1955. 
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2 
The petition is based on the following grounds: 
A. The court erred in holding the legislation did 
not contain more than one subject. 
B. The court erred in holding the legislation was 
not uncertain and ambiguous to the point of being un-
constitutional. 
C. The court erred in finding there was a constitu-
tional delegation of legislative power under H. B. 16 as 
distinguished from the legislation amended thereby. 
D. The court erred in finding the act not discrimi-
natory. 
E. The court erred in holding that H. B. 16 did not 
impair the obligations of contracts in an unconstitutional 
manner. 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The undersigned, one of the attorneys for the plain-
tiffs and petitioners, certifies in support of this petition 
for r.ehearing that in his opinion there is good re~son to 
believe that the opinion and judgment of thi.s court 
heretofore rendered is erroneous and that the case ought 
to be reexamined. 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Petitioners 
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PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF ON REHEARING 
A. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE LEGISLATION 
DID NOT CONTAIN MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT. 
The court admits that the legislation in Chapter 25, 
Session Laws of 1955, is for (a) the regulation, control 
and revocation of charters of non-profit social clubs 
(Court's Opinion, Paragraph A, subparagraph 2), and 
(b) that it amends certain portions of the Liquor Control 
Act, Title 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Court's 
Opinion, Paragraph A, subparagraph 4) 
"it will be found that that provisions of the Liquor 
Control Act, Title 32, which are amended ... " 
Admitting that the basic purpose of the law deals 
with the regulation, control and revocation of charters 
of non-profit social clubs, and that the provisions con-
tained in the law and in the title amend at least two 
sections of Title 32, can it be contended that in view of 
State vs. Alta Club, 120 U. 121, 232 P(2) 759, that the 
amendments to the Utah Liquor Control Act are in any 
way part of the subject of the revocation, control and 
regulation of charters of non-profit social clubs~ 
The amended act .states : 
"The so-called 'locker system' for the storage 
and serving of intoxicating liquors shall be legal 
in this State only when operated by a non-profit 
corporation in compliance with the terms of this 
chapter." 
The Alta Club case clearly holds that any legal 
entity, be it corporation or individual, may store and 
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consume beverages purchased from the right source, the 
Utah Liquor Commission, in any place other than places 
expressly prohibited by the Utah Liquor Control Act. 
We contend that in any reasonable interpretation of Sec-
tion 2 of H. B. 16 that the references to an amendment 
to Title 32 are and must be a separate subject from the 
regulation of .social clubs. 
B. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE LEGISLATION 
WAS NOT UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS TO THE POINT 
OF BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The court at B (paragraph one of the majority 
opinion) after setting out several of the terms objected 
to in the legislation as being ambiguous states: 
"The emphasized terms above recited are 
admittedly somewhat nebulous," 
and then sets forth rules from Peterson vs. Sundt, et ux, 
67 Ariz. 312, 195 P ( 2) 158, 
"Legislation should not be judicially declared 
invalid on the ground that it is unintelligible or 
uncertain unless it is so imperfect and deficient as 
to render it susceptible of no reasonable construc-
tion that will give it effect, or the court finds itself 
unable to divine the purpose and intent of the 
Legislature," 
and setting forth from State vs. Packard, ____________ u ____________ , 
250 P(2) 561: 
"If the statute is so designed that persons of 
ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding, 
can tell what their conduct must be to conform 
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5 
to its requirements, and it is susceptible of uni-
form interpretation and applic.ation by those 
charged with the responsibility of enforcing it, it 
is invulnerable to an attack for vagueness." 
Keeping in mind that in State vs. Packard, supra, 
Mr. Justice Crockett in construing Section 49-1-29, U.C.A. 
1943, which provides as follows : 
"It is the duty of every person before com-
mencing employment with any person, firm or 
corporation whose employees are out on labor 
strike called by a national recognized union to 
register with the industrial commission of Utah," 
and in discussing the terms, "commencing employment" 
and "called by a national recognized union," sets forth 
at length decisions regarding the tests of what constitutes 
such uncertainty or ambiguity as to render a statute 
invalid and holds the legislation void due to ambiguity of 
the emphasized phrases. In addition to the language used 
in the prevailing opinion the court at headnote 4 of the 
Packard case, supra, quotes from Connally vs. General 
Construction Co., 269 U.S., 385, 46 S. Ct., 126, 127, 70 L. 
ed. 322, 
"'* * * a statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its .application 
violates the first es.sential of due process of 
law. * * *'" 
and from City of Price vs. Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P(2) 
606, 607, 
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" 'the right * • * to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated' was 
held so vague and uncertain that it did not define 
a crime." 
It should be noted in the Price vs. Jaynes case, supra, 
the word "unreasonable" as referring to searches and 
seizures is the same root word "reasonable" that is 
one of the words used in several of the phrases objected 
to in the instant legislation as being too ambiguous and 
uncertain for interpretation or enforcement. 
We are aware that the court sets forth in the case 
at hand 
"It is important to keep in mind that it per-
tains to the issuance and regulation of such char-
ters and is not a criminal statute involving the 
sanctions of punishment for crime for failure to 
comply with it.s provisions," 
and we feel it necessary to point out relative to this 
statement that as late as December, 1956, in State vs. 
Ledkens, __________ Utah __________ , 303 P(2) 1099, this court held, 
with four justices concurring, and one concurring in the 
result, that 
and 
"The same basic rules apply to statutory con-
struction of criminal and civil statutes," 
"The rule of strict construction of penal 
statutes does not apply in Utah and hence there 
is no makeweight in favor of a penal statute in 
determining the effect of partial invalidity." 
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We also point out that the court fails to consider in 
its discussion of ambiguity and uncertainty that by fail-
ure to comply with what the Secretary of State or one of 
his successors considers to be reasonable, consistent, 
suitable, etc., all the clubs or any of them, with no mis-
feasance on their part whatsoever, may be deprived of 
property in the nature of a charter and a $5,000.00 bond 
forfeiture. 
Using the rules applied by the court in the majority 
opinion from Peterson vs. Sundt, supra, and State vs. 
Packard, supra, together with the further citations in 
this brief taken from State vs. Packard, can it be said 
that the legislation being construed contains that cer-
tainty or lack of ambiguity necessary to constitutionality1 
Are the fourteen regulations required by the statute 
so designed that persons of ordinary intelligence who 
would be law-abiding can tell what their conduct must 
be to conform to the requirements 1 Is it susceptible to 
uniform application and interpretation by the present 
Secretary of State and those succeeding him in office~ 
This court in the Packard case, supra, at paragraph 
7, page 564, sets forth the test a statute must meet to be 
valid, as follows: 
"It must be sufficiently definite (a) to inform 
persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be 
law abiding, what their conduct must be to con-
form to its requirements; (b) to advise a de-
fendant accused of violating it just what con-
stitutes the offense with which he is charged, and 
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(c) to be su.sceptible of uniform interpretation 
and application by those charged with respon-
sibility of applying and enforcing it." 
Can it be contended that the legislation being con-
tested fits these rules when applied as a whole or applied 
to the fourteen numbered requirements~ Is .such a guide 
set up as to inform the person of ordinary intelligence 
what his conduct must be~ Does it inform him of what 
offenses are constituted which he must steer clear of, 
and is it susceptible of uniform application by the one 
administrative official charged with enforcing the law 
and his successors~ 
The law as written, in leaving to the Secretary of 
State the full power to interpret and apply the regula-
tions set out in Section 2 of H. B. 16, puts that admini-
strative official in the same position as Humpty Dumpty 
in Carroll's "Alice in Wonderland," quoted by eminent 
courts in many opinions, and last quoted by Cecil Sims 
in his excellent article in the January issue of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal, Vol. 43, page 33 : 
"When I used a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a 
rather scornful tone, "It means just what I choose it to 
mean - neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "Whether you can 
make words mean so many different things." 
"The question is," .said Humpty Dumpty, "Which 
is to be the master- that's all." 
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c. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THERE WAS A CON-
STITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
UNDER H. B. 16 AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE LEGIS-
LATION AMENDED THEREBY. 
The court in the main opinion under paragraph C 
discusses the question of delegation of a judicial func-
tion and falls back on Citizens Club vs. Welling, 83 U. 
81, 27 P(2) 23, and Entre Nous Cl~tb vs. Toronto, 
____________ u. ____________ , 287 P(2) 670, together with A. R. Young 
Constntction Co. vs. Dunne, 123 Kans. 176, 254 P. 323, 
as authority for its position. These cases are readily dis-
tinguishable from the instant case. In each of the above 
cases, the court is adjudicating a situation where the 
administrative revocation of a corporate charter was 
based on violation of conditions in the legislation in 
existence when the corporate charters were issued, and 
in each case the revocation took away nothing but the 
charters which had been issued under legislation which 
also provided for revocation under the "Lord giveth and 
the Lord taketh away" doctrine set forth in the Young 
Construction Co. vs. Dunne, supra. 
It is important to note that in all three of the cited 
cases revocations were had after opportunity for hearing, 
and that the revocation of the Dunne case was for failure 
to pay franchise fees as required by the legislation for 
continuing the charter and the administrative board's 
function was the ministerial act of checking the books 
of account in order to make a determination of payment 
or non-payment; the board used no discretion in its act 
whatsoever. 
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This court states further in the main opinion : 
"In view of the fact that this court is com-
mitted to the proposition decided in Citizens Club 
vs. Welling and Entre N ous Club vs. Toronto 
both supr.a, we are not now disposed to reconside; 
such rulings," 
and in doing so .apparently ignored the following proposi-
tions that distinguish those cases from the instant ca.se. 
First, both decisions cited are under the section of 
the statute repealed by the present legislation, which is 
vastly different from the present legislation. 
Second, in both prior decisions with the allowed 
revocation clause was in existence at the time of the issu-
ance of the charter being revoked, and the revocation was 
for breach of a condition contained in the law at the 
time the charter was issued. 
In contrast, all the plaintiffs in the present case had 
eharters existing and in operation at the time the l.aw 
being construed was passed, and none of the plaintiff 
clubs have "voluntarily elected to apply for and receive 
privileges from the State," nor have they submitted to 
new regulations to keep prior privileges. Each was incor-
por.ated long prior to the objectionable legislation, and 
had they voluntarily submitted to the new conditions, 
the original writ from which this petition arise.s would 
never have been filed. 
Third, in the three cases cited, the only forfeitures 
were (a) revocation of a charter previously granted by 
the State in the two Utah cases for violation of a criminal 
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statute prohibiting gambling and a criminal statute pro-
hibiting the sale of liquor, both statutes being in existence 
when the charters were granted, and (b) in the Kansa.s 
case for a clear-cut failure to pay franchise fees required 
by legislation under which the charter was issued, each 
case coming under the Young Construction Co. vs. Dunne 
case, supra: 
"The corporation owed its existence to the 
state. The powers and privilege of the corporation 
were conferred upon conditions imposed by the 
legislature . . . when the corporation accepted 
the charter, it consented to ... the conditions ... 
and the statute itself became a part of the cor-
porate contract." 
In the instant ca.se, the legislature enlarges the re-
quirements by requiring fourteen new and additional 
acts as set forth by H. B. 16, many of which by the 
court's own statement are "admittedly somewhat nebul-
ous," and c.an in no way meet the language in Young 
Construction vs. Dunne case supra, "by acts and omis-
sions which the legislature has in plain terms declared 
shall operate as a forfeiture." 
It is not only the failure of the legislature to spell 
out the procedure of inquiry and forfeiture which is 
abhorrent to constitutionality, but its failure to set out 
an adequate guide for the clubs to know what they are 
expected to comply with and at the same time for the 
administrative official to determine what constitutes a 
violation. 
In addition to the conditions above discussed is the 
requirement of .a $5,000.00 bond of a penal nature, which 
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was not required of these plaintiffs as a condition of 
their charters, and it may be forfeited to the general 
fund of the State by the unguided decision of an adminis-
trative official under the "admittedly somewhat nebu-
lous" requirements set forth in the legislation. 
Also the court must consider that the amended legis-
lation, while making new requirements of existing cluh~ 
in order to keep a charter already issued, does not in 
reality grant any privileges whatsoever, the clubs having 
prior to the legislation had the power, along with individ-
uals and other entities, to store and consume alcoholic 
beverages in places not interdicted by the Utah Liquor 
Control Act, Title 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. See 
State vs. Alta Club, 120 U. 121, 232 P(2) 759. 
D. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACT NOT DIS-
CRIMINATORY. 
The court in holding that the act is not discrimina-
tory seems to ignore several factors. First, Title 16, 
Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is legislation pro-
viding for the incorporation and control of non-profit 
corporations, and provide.s for temporal and spiritual 
corporations as well as social, athletic and recreational, 
and H. B. 16 amending parts of Title 16, Chapter 6, 
U.C.A. 1953, applies to that class of entity or corporation. 
However, Section 1 of the amendatory act limits the non-
profit corporations affected to social, athletic, recrea-
tional or kindred associations, ignoring the other types 
of non-profit corporation.s. Section 2 futher limits the 
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class purporting to be regulated by providing that a 
$5,000.00 bond must be furnished by those corporations 
set forth in Section 1, which now m.aintain or intend to 
maintain premises on which liquor would be stored or 
consumed. 
This court in State vs. Alta Club, supra, holds that 
non-profit corporation.s, together with other entities, may 
store or serve alcoholic beverages on such premises as 
are not expressly interdicted by Title 32, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Section 2 of the present legislation 
limits the requirement of a bond only to those who .af-
firmatively express an intent to consume or serve liquor. 
Section 2 goes on to require the fourteen additional re-
quirements only for those clubs as are required to post 
and keep in effect the $5,000.00 bond, thus leaving a 
situation wherein those who profess an intent to store 
or consume liquor mu.st comply with the act, and upon 
violation of any crimin.al statute or on failure to comply 
with the Secretary of State's idea of what constitutes 
compliance with the fourteen regulations are subject to 
loss of charter, loss of bond, and criminal prosecution 
of any violation of a statute, while .a similar non-profit 
corporation which denies an intent to store or allow 
liquor to be consumed on its premises may allow such 
storage or con.sumption under State vs. Alta Club, supra, 
allow gambling or other penal code violations, and in do-
ing so remain free from the fourteen regulations, and on 
a prosecution for violation of the criminal law be sub-
ject to only a misdemeanor penalty and loss of charter. 
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The court indicates that this amendment as to the 
$5,000.00 bond ignores two factors, one being that for a 
misden1eanor there may be both a fine and a jail sentence 
imposed. We fail to find under the laws of this jurisdic-
tion any instance in which a j.ail sentence may be imposed 
against a corporation. Secondly, the court contend.s the 
bond is voluntarily furnished by the plaintiffs as a con-
dition to receiving privileges .afforded under the statute, 
and that the plaintiffs need not subject themselves to 
such penalty unless they so de.sire. This statement com-
pletely ignores the fact that all of the plaintiff corpora-
tions prior to the passage of H. B. 16 had been granted 
charters by the State and were validly operating under 
said charters .and the ruling of State vs. Alta Club, supra, 
and that the statute coerces them into providing the 
bond or into falsely denying that they intend to store 
or serve liquor on their premises. 
The object of the regulation is undoubtedly to control 
the sale of liquor by non-profit organizations, and the 
provisions of Title 32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, apply 
equally to the entity constituted by non-profit corpora-
tions, the individual, the partnership, or the corporation 
for profit. There can be no doubt under the Alta Club 
decision that an individual person or other entity may 
store and serve alcoholic beverages in any place not ex-
pressly prohibited by the provisions of Title 32, and that 
Title 32 applies equally to all classes, and that the $5,-
000.00 bond and additional regulations applicable only 
to a portion of the class set up by Title 16, Chapter 6, 
are purely discriminatory and unreasonable, the danger 
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therein lying not from violations of the Liquor Control 
Act or other criminal statutes, but lying in the fourteen 
regulations which as drawn are impossible to interpret 
so as to give assurance of compliance. 
This court cites as authority that the requirement 
of the bond is not unjust discrimination the case of 
Freshgrown Preserves Corp., et al., vs. U. 8., 144 Fed. 
(2) 136, 139, which is a case where a $1,000.00 bond was 
set by the government upon returning confiscated mis-
labeled preserves to the company which issued them with 
the express conditions of the bond being set out to insure 
that the company after regaining the chat1tels would 
properly relabel and arrange ,a federal inspection of the 
merchandise before reshipping. The bond was forfeited 
only after failure to comply with the express conditions 
to the individual case. That bond being required after 
an infraction of the law and conditioned to rectify the 
infraction cannot properly be compared with the bond 
in this case, conditioned not only to compliance with 
our penal code as a whole but as to compliance with 
nebulous regulation.s set forth by the contested legisla-
tion under which no person can be sure, despite good 
faith and attempted compliance, that his bond is not 
in jeopardy. 
E. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT H. B. 16 DID 
NOT IMP AIR THE OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS IN AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER. 
While it is admitted as discussed in Point C of this 
brief that the legislature may require compliance with 
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certain conditions set forth at the time of issuance of a 
charter, it is an improper and unconstitutional impair-
ment of contract, even in view of the most liberal proper 
use of the police power, for a legislative act to impair and 
jeopardize contracts not in the future but existing at the 
time of the effective date of the legislation, as in the 
instant case. 
The requirement, for example, that where a club 
lease.s premises, it must have a lease for a minimum of 
one year has the effect of either forfeiting the charter 
of the club or requiring breach of its lease for a lesser 
time in order to comply with the regulation. This is not 
reasonable. Further, the requirements limiting serving of 
food and beverages cuts acros.s contracts presently in 
existence .and has no reasonable relationship to the use 
of police power in regulating the clubs. The Utah Liquor 
Control Act contains express provisions making the 
criminal law relative thereto pertain both to the individ-
ual, be he .servant, master or corporate officer, and 
upon a violation by an employe or independent contractor 
upon the premises imputes liability to the owner or 
possessor of s:aid premises, be he individual or corpora-
tion. See Sections 32-8-7, 32-8-13, 32-8-14, and 32-8-15, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The court states that: 
"They indeed have the same constitutional 
rights of property and contract as all other 
citizens, but they have no constitutional right to 
store and serve liquor on their premises. If they 
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desire to continue to enjoy this privilege, they 
must so conduct their affairs as to comply with 
the legal regulations pertaining thereto." 
We again cite State vs. Alta Club, supra. 
The cases are clear that the right rto contract 1s 
a basic right assured by the constitution, and the consti-
tution expressly forbids impairment of contracts. Under 
the guise of police power the legislation contested in 
regulation 10, 11 and 14, Section 2, Chapter 25, Session 
Laws of 1955, not only denies the right to contract in the 
future to the plaintiffs but cuts directly across the rights 
and obligations under pre-existing contracts with cruter-
ters, landlords and the State. Where and in what w.ay 
can the general welfare require that twelve month leases, 
abrogation of existing caJtering services, or termination 
of existing employment contr,acts, on the basis of regu-
lation of social or athletic clubs~ The right to have valid 
contracts unimpared and the right to collltract granted 
to all by the con.stitution and to the plaintiff clubs by 
Section 16-6-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a basic 
and assured right. As stated by this court in State vs. 
Packard, supra, at page 563 of the Pacific citation: 
"Admittedly, the right is not absolute. It may 
be limited by reasonable regulations correlated 
with the general welfare ... But even for such 
proper purpo.se, great caution must be observed 
in permitting encroachments upon basic rights, 
assured by the constitution, and such restriction 
c.an be effected only in accordance with constitu-
tional prerogatives and where clearly expressed 
standards are set up." 
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CONCLUSION 
This petition is a request that the court review Chap-
ter 25, Session Laws of Utah, 1955, in its entirety, together 
with the prevailing opinion and the two di.ssenting opin-
ions constituting the court's decision quashing the ori-
ginal writ. The legislation is such that five justices of 
this court differ greatly as to whether the legislation 
is valid not on one point but on five, as evidenced by 
the dissenting opinions. Even the writer of the majority 
opinion expresses a doubt from time to time, admitting 
in Paragraph A that the purpose of the law is for the 
control of the clubs, including the plaintiffs, and also 
admitting that amendments were made to Title 32, an 
unrelated act, affirmatively stating that the terms 
claimed to be ambiguous and uncertain were "admittedly 
somewhat nebulous," quoting extensively from State vs. 
Packard as authority to overcome the vague language of 
the law with the realization that the terms construed 
and found by this court to be so vague and uncertain 
in the Packard case as to be unconstitutional were equally 
as capable of interpretation by the ordinary person as 
the terms objected to herein; and then to differentiate 
between the present case and the Packard case pointing 
out that the Packard case involved a criminal statute 
and the case of D.A.V. et al. vs. Toronto is a civil case, 
this in the face of this court's recent opinion on statutory 
construction in State vs. Ledkens, supra. 
The prevailing opinion with regard to delegation 
of a judicial function falls back on the Entre N ous vs. 
Toronto case, supra, and Citizens Club v. Welling, supra, 
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admittedly decided under a different statute repealed 
by this law, but apparently fails to take into considera-
tion the fact that all the plaintiff clubs were existing and 
chartered by the State prior to the contested legislation. 
In Paragraph D the court attempts to overcome the 
exorbitant nature of the $5,000.00 penal bond on the basis 
that a misdemeanor which applies to other entities and 
the clubs alike may provide for .a jail sentence in addition 
to a fine, but in doing so overlooks the fact that no jail 
sentence is or ean be applicable to a corporation under 
the laws of this State, and also on the basis thrut the 
bonds are voluntarily furnished as a condition to the 
receipt of privileges when the plaintiffs already po.ssesed 
these privileges, together with all other entities under this 
court's decision in State vs. Alta Club, supra. 
In Paragraph E, the cour·t admits that the law im-
pairs not only the right of the clubs to contract in the 
future, but impairs presently existing contracts under 
the ·exercise of police power, but with no basis to show 
where such impairment enhances or affects general 
morals and welfare. This legislation, if held constitu-
tional, is a dangerous precedent, and under the guise of 
reasonable exercise of the police power, and without a 
showing of necessity to protect the public morals or wel-
fare, it runs roughshod over some of the most valuable 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States and the State of Utah, including the right to due 
process, the right to be advised by law understandable to 
the ordinary person as to what his conduct must be to 
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avoid conflict with the law, the right to contract without 
fear of legislative impairment, and the right to a hearing 
before judge and jury. And to what purpose~ 
As Justice Henriod points out in his dissentinO' 
b 
opinion, this legislation does not tend to curb consump-
tion of liquor. The legi.slation must be aimed at one of 
two ends: (a) Elimination of sale of alcoholic beverages, 
or (b) elimination of the less affluent social and athletj(' 
clubs, and in so eliminating enhance the coffers of the 
State at the rate of $5,000.00 per whack. 
If (a) above is the aim, the legisl8!ture has heretofore 
fortified and protected the public morals and welfare in 
an adequate manner by the Liquor Control Act, Title 
32, which applies to all persons, both individual and 
corporate, without discrimination, provides for due pro-
cess, for judicial trial, and does not impair the right of 
contract, and does not abuse the police power to a point 
of creating the first large srtep towards the police state. 
If (b) above is the purpose of the legislature, this legis-
lation will effect that purpose and in doing so create 
a long and chaotic episode during which victim clubs will 
fumble and grope in an attempt to comply with regula-
tions they cannot understand and will finally go under 
.as the Secretary of State in an honest effort to comply 
without a guide with nebulous duties under the law re-
vokes charters and forfeits bonds because the regulations 
of the "skid row" club do not appear to be consistent 
with those of the millionaire "tennis and polo" club, 
and the skid row club mus~t be in violation because the 
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Secretary has nothing whatsoever to guide him and the 
polo club cannot be wrong because it has been established 
since the turn of the century and its members are such 
fine, upstanding, well-heeled folk. 
On the basis of the above consideration, we respect-
fully ask that ,a rehearing be allowed, thart the temporary 
writ be reinst~ated, and further proceedings and consider-
ation be permitted in the above matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY S. ~1cCARTY and 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Petitioners 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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